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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Andreas Lehnert
By Mercedes Cardona
Andreas Lehnert was chief of the Federal Reserve’s Household and Real Estate Finance Section
at the onset of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC) and played a key role in
implementing the Fed’s research and policy agenda on financial stability. He developed and
helped run the Fed’s first regulatory bank stress tests in 2009, and in 2010 played a role in
launching the Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research, which became the Division of
Financial Stability. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Lehnert.
Basic economic research has great value in a crisis.
The financial ecosystem is complicated, and it pays to know how it will react to
macroeconomic conditions in a crisis, says Lehnert. “Now we call that macroprudential
stress testing and there’s a whole discipline around it, but boy, it sure would have been
valuable to have had that 12–15 years ago,” he said.
Understanding the drivers of decisions among households and businesses becomes crucial
at times when the macroeconomic factors are under stress, says Lehnert. But at the time of
the GFC, there was little research on factors such as the stigma of foreclosure or how
households would react to having negative equity in their homes. “When the economy gets
pushed away from its steady state, all the normal statistical relationships just go out the
window,” said Lehnert. He elaborated further:
There was a lot of confusion because all agencies were ultimately relying either on
the same set of not very granular data that were available from commercial vendors,
or the banks’ own reports of their exposures. There just wasn’t, at least in the early
days, an agreed-upon set of just basic facts. People would say, “This large bank holds
zero subprime exposure.” Really? Zero subprime? You sort of dig into it and maybe
(there’s) mortgages to borrowers with credit scores in the 500s but they have a
relationship with these borrowers, they really believe in them, and they don’t think
that they’re really subprime, you know? They just happen to have missed several
payments on lots of different loans over the last few years. That is the kind of thing
that can delay coordination and policymaking.
Lehnert developed the first bank stress tests for the Fed in 2009. He described the
experience as “touching a moving conveyor belt and getting dragged into the machine.” The
initial stress-test attempts found the banks struggling with their own data and models,
sometimes not even able to project the losses they were already seeing on residential
mortgages using their existing data and models. Lehnert recalled,
One of the things that I worked on there was ultimately developing a very strippeddown and simple model that projected defaults over a two-year planning horizon
based on just a handful of key risk indicators. Just fairly simply, having that kind of
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independent benchmark developed by the supervisor was incredibly useful. It really
proved to be a very, very useful way to understand risks across banks. That was, in
some sense, a key innovation that we built on into the CCAR [Comprehensive Capital
and Analysis Review] Program.
Strong and resilient banks are the core of the financial system. When their stability is
threatened, stabilizing them must be a priority.
The housing bubble was evident in real time as early as 2005, when the Fed’s June 2005
Open Market Committee discussed it. But at the time, the feeling was that house prices
would “rust, not bust,” noted Lehnert. There wasn’t a clear appreciation of the risk posed
by the residential mortgage market. “Subprime mortgages were seen as a potentially
serious problem for the borrower, but not a systemic risk,” he said.
The mortgage servicers were not set up to handle the volume of foreclosures and defaults
that overwhelmed them in the crisis, having spent the previous years driving down costs
and increasing volume. Using today’s macro tools, regulators would have put measures in
place in 2003–04 to avoid the mortgage bust, but by 2006–07, it was too late for those
macroprudential tools. Lehnert noted,
The 2007–2009 episode obviously is just incredibly salient. First and most
important, we learned the importance of having strong and resilient banks at the
center of the financial system. When you had banks and quasi-banks like Lehman
that were fragile, that was a problem. The system was totally unable to cope with
the credit losses from the house price decline. That’s ultimately why Congress had to
pass TARP, why we needed to do the first stress test, the SCAP. I think that lesson
appears so far in 2020 to have paid off.
The financial regulators should share information regularly before and during a
crisis: don’t get caught scrambling to understand a crisis.
The regulatory system works fine when times are normal. In normal operations
interactions between agencies are channeled in very clear ways. Lehnert noted agencies
are a bit like countries: “They have their own distinct culture, in certain cases their own
distinct language [and] conventions.” But, he stressed, in times of crisis, when bold, quick
responses are necessary, agencies need to work together closely.
Lehnert shared that it had been important in the fall of 2008 to learn quickly who his key
contacts were at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Treasury Department. He
benefited from having worked with Sandra Braunstein and her team at the Fed Division of
Consumer and Community Affairs (DCCA) starting in 2007. They were the staff dealing
with borrowers and frontline staff dealing with the foreclosure wave.
I think it was one of these emergency situations where it was just fantastic to have
the channels of communication open, to have those relationships in place. Then of
course, when we transitioned into thinking more about mortgage modifications, this
was a group of people that had a lot of experience with the issues around helping
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troubled borrowers. The Feds, predatory lending/subprime mortgages, all of that
stuff was run out of DCCA. You would probably have to go talk to Alan Greenspan to
find out exactly what people were thinking, but that group was just absolutely firstrate when it came to actually managing the fallout of the crisis.
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was one legacy of the GFC that targeted that
compartmentalization that surfaced as a weakness during the crisis. Lehnert described it as
a clearinghouse of information and a discussion forum where agencies can share their
observations. Lehnert sees great value in its structure:
It’s not an incredibly visible or high-profile part of the FSOC’s mission, but if you
wind back the clock 12 years, if the Lehnert of 2006–2007 had been plugged into an
FSOC process, that guy would have known his counterparts at all the other relevant
agencies. They would have hashed through all the data limitations that they were
dealing with, and we would have overcome a lot of the initial friction.
I can say during the current pandemic the FSOC’s key staff group, which is called the
Systemic Risk Committee, has been meeting every week since the current crisis
began. It is a really important forum for information sharing and real-time analysis.
It doesn’t quite have the same headline-grabbing appeal, but from my perspective as
a foot soldier in the last crisis, it would have been great to have had something like
this in place back then.
Lehnert joined Nellie Liang in launching the Fed’s Office of Financial Stability Policy and
Research, another vehicle to share intelligence. The office later became the Division of
Financial Stability. He was named director when Liang retired from the position in 2016.
He reflected on the office:
That was, I think, the guiding spirit behind several innovations, most importantly
my division at the Fed. The idea was, look, let’s build on the strengths that were
demonstrated during the financial crisis so that we don’t have to, on the fly, reinvent
the processes, to organize data analysis, people, to address financial stability issues.
Nellie Liang and I left our division in November of 2010 to form a little group that
was supposed to act as a kind of clearinghouse and coordinating function. We’ve
evolved over the years, but we continue to essentially be, in part, a kind of cultural
exchange program. We bring in people from all over the Federal Reserve, from all
different parts of the Federal Reserve, to work jointly on a kind of financial stability
assessment project. And of course, now that we’ve moved into more crisis
management mode, obviously for that as well. I think that has been a key difference.
Dated: December 2021
YPFS Lessons Learned No: 2019-43

33

